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BOOK REVIEW
RETHINKING THE CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH
REGULATION
ROBERT A. KAHN
THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING RESPONSES
AND REGULATIONS. Edited by Michael Herz and Peter Molnar.
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS. 2012. PP. 544.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the early 1990s, I was in graduate school at Johns Hopkins
University studying Holocaust denial litigation.' A friend in the de-
partment from Canada told me that I supported freedom of speech
for deniers because the United States was a big country that, unlike
Canada, could afford to ignore international treaties banning hate
speech.2 After several conversations, I decided to focus my disserta-
* Associate Professor of Law University of St. Thomas (Minnesota). BA Colum-
bia University, JD New York University School of Law, PhD (in Political Science)
from Johns Hopkins University. The author thanks Jacqueline Baronian for her
helpful comments. I would also like to thank the students of my Hate Speech:
Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives class at the University of St. Thomas
School of Law. Many of the ideas in this paper-especially those related to the
Internet and social media-arose from class discussions.
I My dissertation, which looked at Holocaust denial litigation in France, Germa-
ny, Canada and the United States, was published in 2004. See ROBERT A. KAHN,
HOLOCAUST DENIAL AND THE LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2004).
2 For example, Article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and Article 20 of the International Con-
vention on Civil and Political Rights call for bans against hate speech. See Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
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tion on criminal procedure rather than freedom of speech.3 Quite
simply, the back and forth over which approach to hate speech-
American, Canadian, or European-was "better" did not strike me as
that much fun.4 At the same time, I had to admit there was something
to my friend's argument. In the arguments for and against freedom
of speech that I read in the United States, following international
treaties did not take pride of place. Perhaps this was because, as a
large country, the United States was free to ignore international
norms.5
I thought about this question a great deal while reading Mi-
chael Herz and Peter Molnar's fascinating volume of essays: The Con-
tent and Context of Hate Speech: Rethinking Regulation and Respons-
G.A. Res 20/2106, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2106(XX) (Dec. 21, 1965); Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), at 55, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/2200 (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966).
3 While most of my book views Holocaust denial litigation from the vantage
point of comparative criminal procedure, I added a section suggesting that atti-
tudes toward freedom of speech shaped the informal types of censorship taken
against Holocaust denial. See KAHN,supra note 1, at 121-152.
4As Eric Heinze describes, only partially tongue in cheek:
European conferences on hate speech follow a similar pat-
tern. A few Americans make impassioned speeches about the
values of freedom and democracy. The Europeans dutifully
listen and applaud. Then come tea and biscuits, where the
pros and cons of various positions are exchanged with tepid
enthusiasm. All delegates are then thanked for having at-
tended an event that "will surely provide food for thought."
The Europeans depart with the same views they held when
they arrived; and the Americans leave crestfallen from a
missionary venture that failed to convert a single soul.
Eric Heinze, Wild-West Cowboys versus Cheese-Eating Surrender Mon-
keys: Some Problems in Comparative Approaches to Hate Speech, in
EXTREME SPEECH AND DEMOCRACY, 182, 182 (Ivan Hare & James Wein-
stein eds., 2009).
5 Meanwhile, Canada is not only a small country; it is a small country next to the
United States, something that has shaped Canadian attitudes toward hate
speech regulation. See Robert A. Kahn, Hate Speech and National Identity: The
Case of the United States and Canada, U. OF ST. THOMAS LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH
PAPER SERIES, No. 08-02, 8-14 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1104478 (de-
scribing Canadian fears that U.S. "racism" will undermine Canada's multicultur-
al society).
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es.6 The volume covers a wide range of subjects, including defama-
tion of religions, Holocaust denial, state-sanctioned incitement to
genocide, and the problems posed by satellite transmission of hate.7
Many leading scholars in the field appear on these pages, such as
Robert Post, Bhikhu Parekh, Jeremy Waldron, and the late Ed Baker
and Ronald Dworkin.8 The geographic scope of the -volume is im-
pressive. Contributions feature the law of sub-Saharan Africa9 and
the countries of the post-Soviet world.' 0 The book includes excellent
descriptive analyses of the treatment of hate speech under the Amer-
6 THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION AND RESPONSES
(Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012) [hereinafter "THE CONTENT AND
CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH"].
See Julie Suk, Denying Experience: Holocaust Denial and the Free-Speech Theory
of the State, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 144-63;
Kwame Antony Appiah, What's wrong with Defamation of Religions?, in THE
CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 164-83; Irwin Cotler,
State-Sanctioned Incitement to Genocide: The Responsibility to Prevent, in THE
CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6 at 430-55; Monroe Price, Or-
biting Hate? Satellite Transponders and Free Expression, in THE CONTENT AND
CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 514-37.
8 See Interview with Robert Post, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, SU-
pra note 6, at 11-36; Bhikhu Parekh, Is there a Case for Banning Hate Speech?, in
THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 37-56; Jeremy Wal-
dron, Hate Speech and Political Legitimacy, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE
SPEECH, supra note 6, at 329-40; Ed Baker, Hate Speech, in THE CONTENT AND
CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 57-81; Ronald Dworkin, Reply toJeremy
Waldron, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 341-44.
See Yared Legesse Mengistu, Shielding Marginalized Groups from Verbal As-
saults, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 352-77 (de-
scribing the case law of Ethiopia, Rwanda and South Africa).
'0 See Andrei Richter, One Step Beyond Gate Speech: Post-Soviet Regulation of
"Extremist" and "Terrorist" Speech in the Media, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF
HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 290-305 (discussing examples from Russia and
other former CIS states). In addition, Mengistu and Cotler in separate chapters
each do a very nice job describing the hate speech cases arising out of the
Rwandan Genocide. See Cotler, supra note 7, at 438-45; Mengistu, supra note 9,
at 372-74. Meanwhile, Cotler and Price each take up hate speech in the Middle
East. See Cotler, supra note 7, at 445-54 (describing Iran's state sponsored
campaign to dehumanize Jews, Zionists and Israel); Price, supra note 7, at 520-
30 (describing broadcasts aimed at Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kurdish
groups).
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ican Convention on Human Rights," in the policy pronouncements
of the Council of Europe (including in the jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights),12 and in the case law of a variety of
countries including the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom,
Germany, and Hungary.'3
There is also a great deal of theory-building in the volume.
This theory-building is striking for its originality as well as its diver-
sity. Alon Harel proposes treating speech more leniently when it is
"deeply rooted" as part of a "comprehensive and valuable form of
life" of the speaker.'4 Fredrick Schauer challenges the assumption
dating back to John Stuart Mill that a society always benefits by pro-
tecting demonstrably false speech.15 Katharine Gelber, seeking a
middle ground between legal sanctions and official neutrality, would
like to see the state help victims and bystanders respond to hate
speech with "counterspeech."16 Meanwhile, Toby Mendel calls on in-
" See Eduardo Bertoni & Julio Rivera Jr., The American Convention on Human
Rights: Regulation of Hate Speech and Similar Expression, in THE CONTENT AND
CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 499, 501-06.
12 See generally, Tarlach McGonagle, Council of Europe Strategies for Countering
Hate Speech, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 456-
98.
13 Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional jurisprudence: A Comparative
Analysis, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 242-72.
14 Alon Harel, Hate Speech and Comprehensive Forms of Life, in THE CONTENT AND
CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 306. Harel argues that otherwise the
state can be seen as condemning the speaker's core identity. Id. What is particu-
larly noteworthy about Harel's argument is what he does with speech acts that
do not fit this category: Stray insults, and speech "deeply rooted" in a "compre-
hensive way of life" that is not "valuable" (i.e. Nazi and KKK speech) are given
less protection, id. at 306-07, language recalling the discussion of "low value"
speech in mid-twentieth century U.S. cases such as Chaplinksy v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (concluding that punishing fighting words
presents no constitutional problem since it plays "no essential part of any expo-
sition of ideas") and Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1952) (apply-
ing the same principle to a group libel statute).
" Frederick Schauer, Social Epidemiology, Holocaust Denial, and the Post-Millian
Calculus, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 129-43.
16 Katharine Gelber, Reconceptualizing Counterspeech in Hate Speech Policy (with
a focus on Australia), in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at
210-16.
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ternational courts to provide a clearer interpretive framework for
regulating hate speech.'7
Another major theme is context. Stephen Holmes, comment-
ing on the clash between Ronald Dworkin and Jeremy Waldron over
the legitimacy of hate speech bans, raises the possibility that their
differences reflect a greater acceptance of hate speech in Europe
than in the United States.18 Jamal Greene, taking a political science
approach, views the U.S. preference for protecting hate speech as
resting on potentially changeable attitudes (rather than on immuta-
ble traditions).'9 Finally, Arthur Jacobson and Bernhard Schlink,
looking at Title VII, U.S. college campuses, and broadcast regulation
in the United States, argue that the United States punishes hate
speech as much as Europe does, but it does so in different ways.20
The volume is the product of collaboration between U.S. and
Hungarian legal scholars. It grew out of a conversation between
Hungary's Representative on Freedom of the Media for the Organiza-
tion for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Miklos Haraszti, and
Monroe Price, former dean of Cardozo Law School, about the "wildly
divergent approaches to 'hate speech."'21 The conversation led to
conferences in New York and Budapest during which Peter Molnar,
an activist, writer, and former member of Parliament in Hungary,
played a leading role. Molnar conducted four interviews with leading
" Toby Mendel, Does International Law Provide Consistent Rules on Hate
Speech?, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 417-29.
'8 Stephen Holmes, Waldron, Machiavelli, and Hate Speech, in THE CONTENT AND
CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 345-51.
19 Jamal Greene, Hate Speech and the Demos, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE
SPEECH, supra note 6, at 92-115. -
20 Arthur Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink, Hate Speech and Self-Restraint, in THE
CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 217-41.
21 THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at xxiii. Peter Molnar
refers to "hate speech" in quotes as an expression of skepticism about the abil-
ity of the state to define the boundaries of hate speech with legal precision. See
Peter Molnar, Responding to "Hate Speech" with Art, Education, and the Immi-
nent Danger Test, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at
183, n. 2. Tarlach McGonagle in his article adopts Molnar's practice of putting
"hate speech" in quotation marks. See, e.g., McGonagle, supra note 12, at 456
(using quotation marks around "hate speech" in the title and four other times
he uses the term).
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scholars, writers, and lawyers: Yale Law School Dean Robert Post,22
British writer Kenan Malik,23 former ACLU president Nadine
Strossen,24 and civil rights litigator Theodore Shaw.25
While the interviews covered a wide range of subjects,
Molnar always directed the questioning to a 2008 gay pride parade
in Budapest that was attacked by "counter-demonstrators" with
rocks, acid-filled eggs, and bottles.26 Before the parade, members of
extreme right-wing groups used the Internet to encourage their sup-
porters to block the parade, by force if necessary.27 At the parade it-
self, the counter-demonstrators accompanied the attack with homo-
phobic and anti-Semitic remarks.28 After describing the parade,
Molnar asked his interviewee a series of questions, often varying the
facts to pose additional challenges to his interviewee. These re-
sponses offer a rarity in comparative legal studies-leading experts
discussing a common fact pattern rather than talking past each oth-
er.29
22 Interview with Robert Post, supra note 8, at 27.
23 Interview with Kenan Malik, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra
note 6, at 81-91.
24 Interview with Nadine Strossen, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH,
supra note 6, at 378-97.
25 Interview with Theodore Shaw, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, Su-
pro note 6, at 399-413. The book also contains a defense of the "American" per-
spective on hate speech regulation by First Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams.
Floyd Abrams, On American Hate Speech Law, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF
HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at 116-26.
26 See Interview with Robert Post, supra note 8, at 27-30; Interview with Kenan
Malik, supra note 23, at 85-86; Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at
396; Interview with Theodore Shaw, supra note 25, at 410-11. Molnar also dis-
cusses the parade in his own contribution. Molnar, supra note 21, at 194-96.
27 Interview with Robert Post, supra note 8, at 27.
28 d
29 Indeed, the results of the questioning were very interesting-showing points
of divergence and consensus. Robert Post noted the freedom of the gay protest-
ers to express their point of view while rejecting any attempt by the state to re-
strict the counter-demonstrators on "expressive" grounds. He did, however,
draw a line at attempts to intimidate or exclude the gay pride marchers-this
could be criminalized even if expressive. Id. at 27-29. Malik compared the coun-
ter-demonstrators to anti-globalization protesters who trash Starbucks stores
and burn cars and supported tolerating anything short of physical violence. In-
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In addition, the chapters-while taking up wildly divergent
topics-coalesce around a number of themes that collectively ad-
vance our understanding of hate speech regulation. In the rest of this
Article I will focus on three themes in particular. First, as Part II
shows, by taking "context" seriously, the contributors raise the im-
portant question of the role "context" can or should play in an in-
creasingly globalized world.30 Second, as Part III shows, taken as a
whole, the Herz and Molnar volume suggests the United States is less
of an outlier on hate speech regulation than we often assume.31 To
put it another way, it turns out that despite its size, the United States,
far from ignoring the fight against hate speech, at times vigorously
fights such speech-albeit in non-legal ways.32 Third, the contribu-
tors take a nuanced approach to "responses" society takes to hate
speech. As Part IV shows, not all criminal sanctions are alike and
there are a wide variety of non-legal responses-including public
shunning, the use of art to educate people about the dangers of hate,
and state supported counterspeech.33 Although the varying contexts,
complicated role of the United States, and multiple ways to combat
hate speech suggest chaos, the contributors agree on a number of
points.3 4 Part V will suggest next steps for the comparative study of
hate speech regulation, including bringing more world regions into
the analysis as well as exploring the impact of globalized social me-
dia on hate speech regulation.35
terview with Kenan Malik, supra note 23, at 86. Nadine Strossen and Molnar had
a spirited discussion about the legal state of mind required to prosecute the
counter-demonstrators. Specific intent to harm the protesters was not required;
but more than negligence was necessary. Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra
note 24, at 396. Theodore Shaw also focused on the state of mind of the coun-
ter-demonstrators, saying that he could live with a "knew or should have
known standard." Interview with Theodore Shaw, supra note 25, at 411.
3o See infra Part II.
31 See infra Part III.
SSee id.
3 See infra Part IV.
34 See infra Part V.
3 See id.
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II. THE TENSION BETWEEN CONTEXT AND CONVERGENCE IN THE
INTERNET AGE
Similar to Canada, Hungary is a small country and subject to
the whims of international treaties. As such, it punishes hate speech
and, more recently, Holocaust denial.36 However, unlike Canada, the
Hungarian Supreme Court has taken a libertarian approach to hate
speech, one that makes direct reference to the U.S. "clear and present
danger" doctrine.37 The tension between these two approaches is re-
flected in the themes raised by the two Hungarian contributors to
the volume about the role of context in hate speech regulation.38
On one hand, Peter Molnar takes a very post-modern, toler-
ant, forgiving approach to context. In his chapter, "Responding to
'Hate Speech' with Art, Education and the Imminent Danger Test,"
Molnar expresses a hope that could apply to the volume as a whole:
This chapter suggests that we start a new phase in
the discourse on responses to "hate speech." It pro-
poses that discussion be based on a detailed under-
standing of the historical and cultural context of each
country, region, or continent in which the "hate
speech" is spoken. Further, this search must focus on
36 For a discussion of Hungary's hate speech laws, see AndrAs Koltay, The Ap-
pearance of the Clear and Present Danger Doctrine in Hungarian Hate Speech
Laws and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, SOCIAL
SCIENCE RESEARCH NETWORK PAPER (2014), http://ssrn/com/abstract=2457903.
3 Id. at 7-8 (describing Hungarian hate speech regulations). The clear and pre-
sent danger test was developed by justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. While it was
used to suppress speech in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919), the
same case in which Justice Holmes said one does not have the right to yell "fire"
in a crowded theater, id., during the 1920s and 30s the doctrine became associ-
ated with protecting speech. For an overview of this period, see Wallace
Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger: From Schenck to Dennis, 52 COLUM. L. REV.
313, 314-20 (1952); Koltay, supra note 36, at 2-6.
3 Miklos Haraszti, Foreword: Hate Speech and the Coming Death of the Interna-
tional Standard before It Was Born (Complaints of a Watchdog), in THE CONTEXT
AND CONTENT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at xv-xvi. Molnar, supra note 21, at
184.
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the most effective law and policy against such
speech.39
This call for a "detailed understanding" of "the historical and cultural
content" of regions, countries, and continents resonates throughout
the book.40 Under Molnar's gentle questioning, Robert Post relaxed
his view that legitimate democracies do not punish speech that is
part of the public discourse.41 Instead, taking a "highly contextualist"
approach,42 Post concedes that "[iun some contexts, hate speech
might so delegitimize democracy as to justify excluding hate speech
from the formal definition of freedom of speech[.]"43 Another strong
defender of free speech, First Amendment attorney Floyd Abrams,
makes a similar concession: "[A]s I have observed previously, I can-
not condemn or even criticize states such as Germany and India,
which have acted [to ban hate speech] in light of their own historical-
ly demonstrated needs."44
On the other hand, Miklos Haraszti, fresh from six years of
protecting the media from state encroachment, takes a more skepti-
cal approach towards context. While not denying the benefits that
come from "diplomatic bargaining between local and global 'values',"
he warns that "[t]he international community may pay too high a
price for too few concessions if it legitimates local taboos and aban-
39 Molnar, supra note 21 at 184 (emphasis added).
40 For example, Rosenfeld, while not taking "a purely contextual approach" to
hate speech regulation, states that "where and under what circumstances hate
speech is uttered" can "make a difference" in whether or not to prohibit it.
Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 243, 246. See also Holmes, supra note 18, at 346
(arguing that Euro-American differences in approach to hate speech regulation
reflect "different historical experiences").
41 Interview with Robert Post, supra note 8, at 23-26. Post takes a much narrow-
er position in his earlier writing. See Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy
and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv, 267, 287 (1991) (suggesting
that "successful" and "stable" democracies do not restrict access to the public
discourse). For more on Post's evolving views, see Robert A. Kahn, Why Do Eu-
ropeans Ban Hate Speech? A Debate Between Karl Loewenstein and Robert Post,
41 HOFSTRA L. REv. 545, 568-84 (2013).
42 Interview with Robert Post, supra note 8, at 24.
43 Id. at at 25. Post goes on to say that in other times, punishing hate speech
would constitute "censorship." Id
44 Abrams, supra note 25, at 126.
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dons insistence on every person's right to beliefs that are unpopular,
even ugly, as long as they do not infringe on other people's rights."45
What is more, the "territorial jurisdiction over media content has
evaporated," raising questions about the meaning of national or re-
gional context in an increasingly interconnected world. Thanks to
the Internet and other global platforms, "organized" hate speech can
now be delivered right at home, anonymously, without being re-
strained by distance, rules, or culture.46
Ronald Dworkin raised another concern about context. Re-
sponding to the claim that had he been born in Europe, he would
have supported hate speech bans, Dworkin said that an "explanation
of a conviction's genesis is not an argument for its truth."47 Put an-
other way, context can only go so far. Many of the arguments in The
Content and Context of Hate Speech are universal in scope, or apply in
ways that do not neatly align with national borders. For example,
Alon Harel's argument that the state should give greater protection
to "deeply rooted" expressions of "comprehensive ... form of life" is
not logically limited by culture, history, or geography.48 While Fred-
erick Schauer addresses context in his discussion of harmful falsity,
the context in question is occupational, not regional-the harm
posed by falsity is much greater in the general public than in the ivo-
ry towers of academia, where it can be rebutted.49
Context also raises practical hazards. For instance, a focus on
context makes it harder to enforce international standards, which
45 Haraszti, supra note 38, at xv. There is also a Foreword by Adam Liptak, Su-
preme Court reporter for the New York Times. See Adam Liptak, Foreword: Hate
Speech and Common Sense, in THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra
note 6, at xix-xxii.
46 Haraszti, supra note 38, at xvi. I wonder how the proponents of "extensive
regulation" actually imagine curbing hate speech online. Can they avoid the only
known "solution" to controlling the Internet-already realized by China or
Iran-which is the carving up of the global network into nationally controlled
intranets?
47 Dworkin, supra note 8, at 344. Dworkin was responding to Stephen Holmes's
characterization of American free speech absolutism as a form of "cultural an-
thropology." Holmes, supra note 18, at 346.
48 See Harel, supra note 14, at 306.
49 See Schauer, supra note 15, at 140-41.
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can give courts too much flexibility. Describing the jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights, Toby Mendel complains that
the court rulings "often spend very little time analyzing the im-
pugned speech itself' and provide "little legal analysis for their hold-
ings."50 Indeed, "[i]t sometimes appears that the decision hinges
primarily on whether the content and intent of the speech in ques-
tion appears to be of a racist character," continues Mendel.51
But if context can be misused, the pressures of globalization
can be overstated. While some scholars like Ruti Teitel see an emerg-
ing global convergence of normS,52 these "global norms" still have to
be applied in concrete contexts. While Haraszti is correct that the In-
ternet can deliver information unrestrained by "distance, rules, or
culture," the impact of that speech on the society in question will be
shaped by these factors.53 In other words, even if the Internet sends
the same hate messages to computer screens in New York, Budapest,
or Toronto, the impact of this speech on the surrounding society will
vary in ways that will depend heavily on the type of contextual fac-
tors Molnar and many of the contributors to The Content and Context
of Hate Speech emphasize.5 4
In addition, the idea that the only response to online hate is
for states to tear up the information highway and replace it with
their own, much smaller "intranets" is subject to question. Monroe
Price's discussion of the regulation of satellite transponders suggests
that, with help from the private sector, states can take steps to regu-
so Mendel, supra note 17.
51 Id.
52 See Robert A. Kahn, Flemming Rose's Rejection of the American Free Speech
Canon and the Poverty of Comparative Constitutional Theory, 39 BROOK. J. INT'L. L.
657, 687-92 (2014) (discussing Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a
Global Age, 117 HARV. L. REv. 2571 (2007)).
53 Haraszti, supra note 38, at xvi.
5 To give a local example, I live in Minnesota where "fuck" is referred to as the
F-bomb and is largely frowned upon. As such, a curse word could well suggest
an intent to intimidate. By contrast, on the East Coast, where I used to live, curs-
ing is more common and would not necessarily indicate a hostile intent. One
well established guidebook warns tourists to Baltimore that the locals use
harsh language in ordinary interactions. See GEOFF BROWN, MOON BALTIMORE 222
(2009).
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late online hate short of breaking up the Internet.55 While the tactic
of jamming frequencies-the satellite equivalent of breaking off from
the Internet-has been used, it is often short term and done in con-
junction with other policies.56 Finally, while the danger is real that
states will follow China and Iran and carve up the Internet, the type
of nationalism implied in this effort is very different from the use of
context to understand why a given nation responds to hate speech in
a particular way.
Perhaps a more difficult objection to the use of context is
Dworkin's. While context can explain why a given individual, group
or society objects more or less strenuously to a given type of
speech-for example, why Southern states are particularly sensitive
to cross burning and Ku Klux Klan activity 7-it does not make a giv-
en approach to speech regulation "true" or "false."58 To the extent
that context is used to dismiss the validity of an opposing viewpoint
by attributing it to an American "First Amendment tic"59 or Europe-
an concern with Nazism,6 0 it has a limited role to play. But when Ste-
phen Holmes argues that one reason liberals in the United States
supported free speech so vigorously during the 1950s and 1960s
was to avoid being associated with Communism, and that this "com-
promise" produced a Leftism in the United States that supported lib-
erty but was unable to challenge the power structure,61 I do not see
him making an argument about the validity of a particular approach
to freedom of speech. Rather, I see him as providing context that will
help observers around the world understand what makes freedom of
speech seem so attractive to people in the United States.
5s Price, supra note 7, at 531-32 (describing efforts at regulation).
56 Id. at 523-24 (describing how a combination of jamming and threats led
Deutsche Telekom to stop broadcasting Islah or Reform radio, which the US
government claimed supported terrorism).
5 See Robert A. Kahn, Cross-Burning, Holocaust Denial, and the Development of
Hate Speech Law in the United States and Germany, 83 U. DET. MERcY L. REv. 163
(2006).
58 Dworkin, supra note 8, at 344.
' Id. at 343-44.
6 Holmes, supra note 18, at 346.
61 Id.
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The debate over the use of context in the Herz and Molnar
volume is a rich one. Precisely because they take context into ac-
count, the contributors to The Content and Context of Hate Speech
find themselves in arguments about the strengths and limitations of
context-based approaches to hate speech regulation. As we shall see
in the next section, the openness to context also helps the contribu-
tions call into question one of the established truths of the field-
namely the idea that when it comes to hate speech regulation, the
United States is an outlier.
Ill. How EXCEPTIONAL IS THE UNITED STATES WHEN IT COMES TO
REGULATING HATE SPEECH?
The essays in The Content and Context of Hate Speech under-
mine the defensive approach that United States lawyers and scholars
have taken in international discussions about hate speech regulation.
As Adam Liptak puts it, "The United States' commitment to the pro-
tection of hate speech is distinctive, deep, and authentic-and also
perhaps reflexive, formal, and unthinking."62 This reflects a history
of viewing the United States and Europe as polar opposites. In es-
sence, Europe punishes hate speech; the United States does not. On
this view, the rest of the world does not matter. Instead, the argu-
ment focuses on who has the "right" approach to hate speech regula-
tion.
Added to this descriptive view of the world are normative
defenses of freedom of speech. Freedom of speech is seen as neces-
sary to reach the truth, ensure democratic legitimacy, and protect
personal autonomy.63 Supporting these defenses are maxims about
the way the world works that serve to deepen the argument for tol-
erating speech. These maxims include the fear that restricting one
type of speech would lead to the restriction of other speech (the
slippery slope argument),64 fears that the government would use
hate speech bans against the very minority groups the speech was
62 Liptak, supra note 45, at xix.
63 For the classic overview of this position, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY. 11-15 (1982).
6 Kahn, supra note 52, at 667.
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meant to protect,65 a self-confidence that exposure to hate speech
made citizens braver, more resilient and tolerant of difference,66 and
a belief that the best response to bad speech is more speech.67
It is worth briefly thinking about what the traditional view
leaves out. There is little discussion about why the United States de-
veloped the way it did, and about whether the United States might, at
some point in the future, adopt hate speech bans. Nor does the tradi-
tional view have room for the possibility that the U.S. versus Europe
comparison might actually be wrong, that-in other words-there
might be pockets in the United States where hate speech is pursued
(and repudiated) with the same vigor as in Europe.68 Meanwhile, Eu-
rope is seen as a monolith. There is little appreciation for the differ-
ences among European countries (e.g. the United Kingdom vs. Ger-
many) or between types of hate speech law (Holocaust denial and
blasphemy bans vs. general laws that ban racial or religious incite-
ment). Finally, the part of the world that is not Europe or the United
States did not exist in the traditional view, especially Latin America
and South Asia, which have their own rich traditions of hate speech
regulation, but have received little attention in the U.S. legal acade-
my.69
65 Nadine Strossen made this point in a 1990 law review article. See Nadine
Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.
J. 482, 555-57 (1990).
66 See LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986). See also Kahn, supra note 52, at 668 (describing max-
ims of speech protection).
67 United States Supreme Court justice Louis Brandeis made this observation in
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
Not everyone took this view. See ERIK BLEICH, THE FREEDOM TO BE RACIST? How
THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE STRUGGLE TO PRESERVE FREEDOM AND COMBAT RACISM
(2011) (suggesting that the gap between Europe and the United States is not so
wide as is commonly understood).
6 For an exception, see Tanya Kateri HernAndez, Hate Speech And The Language
Of Racism In Latin America: A Lens For Reconsidering Global Hate Speech Re-
strictions And Legislation Models, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 805 (2014). In addition to
an extensive discussion of hate speech regulation in Brazil, Kateri HernAndez
also relates the widespread presence of hate speech restrictions in Latin Ameri-
ca into a broader argument that there is a growing global consensus in favor of
regulating hate speech in some way. Id at 808.
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One way to decenter the Euro-American dichotomy is to add
more countries. For example, Eduardo Bertoni and Julio Rivera Jr.
view the treatment of hate speech in the Inter-American Convention
on Human Rights as considerably more libertarian than the Interna-
tional Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and European hate
speech bans more generally.70 This reflects the context in which the
Convention was adopted, a time of "authoritarian governments" and
the involvement of U.S. lawyers and diplomats in the drafting of the
treaty.71 At the same time, Article 13(5) of the American Convention
on Human Rights bans "advocacy of national, racial, or religious ha-
tred that constitute incitements to lawless violence."72 This language,
so close to the language in Brandenburg v. Ohion that lets the state
ban speech "likely" to incite imminent violence,74 complicates efforts
to divide the world into a tolerant United States and a Europe that
has draconian hate speech bans.75
Another decentering takes place at the level of theory-
building. In his conversation with Peter Molnar, Robert Post conced-
ed that the legitimacy of hate speech bans may depend on context.7 6
This may owe something to Peter Molnar's persuasive skills-which
70 See Bertoni & Rivera, supra note 11, at 503.
n1 Id. at 512.
72 Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica (B-32), American Convention on Human Rights,
art. 13(5), Nov. 22, 1969, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties-B-
32_AmericanConvention-onHumanRights.htm.
7 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
74 Id. at 447.
75 Andrei Richter's somewhat terrifying account of sweeping media regulations
in post-Soviet Russia reinforces the same conclusion from the opposite direc-
tion. When compared to Russian media laws that give prosecutors great discre-
tion to close radio and TV stations, and punish journalists who interview sus-
pected terrorists, see Richter, supra note 10, at 294, 296-300, the mainstream
European Court of Human Rights regime seems quite tame. For example, in
Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)(1994), the ECHR held that it violat-
ed Article 10 to prosecute a journalist who interviewed skinheads under Danish
hate speech laws. See McGonagle, supra note 12, 460-61 (describingjersild).
7 See Interview with Robert Post, supra note 8, at 25.
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are manifest7 7-but it also reflects a certain tension in Post's demo-
cratic legitimacy theory, a tension perhaps present in all locally root-
ed theories. Simply put, Post's theory responded to critical race theo-
rists who argued in the 1980s and 1990s for campus-based speech
codes.78 As some critical race theorists pointed to Europe,79 Post of-
fered a distinctly American defense of hate speech, one rooted in the
constitutional experiences of the United States.80 At the same time,
however, Post-especially in the aftermath of the Danish Cartoon
controversy81-presented his theory as global in scope.8 2 While Post
has since retreated into contextualism, his experience raises a ques-
tion that haunts The Content and Context of Hate Speech: Has the age
of First Amendment absolutism-if it ever existed-finally come to
an end?
Consider the following evidence from the contributors. After
studying the hate speech laws of the United States, Canada, Britain,
Germany, and Hungary, Michel Rosenfeld, a Cardozo Law Professor,
concluded that "in a world that has witnessed the Holocaust, various
other genocides, and ethnic cleansing, all of which were surrounded
by abundant hate speech, the American way seems definitely less
appealing than its alternatives."83 Miklos Haraszti, while sympathetic
to media protection, still holds to the position that "[alctual instiga-
tions to actual hate crimes must be criminalized" and leaves open the
possibility that other "offensive speech" could be handled "in civil
courts."8 4 Toby Mendel combines concerns about the "abuse" of hate
77I base this on personal conversations with Peter Molnar (he is a very engaging
person) as well as his ability to draw out the best in the people he interviewed
for the book
n See, e.g., MARI J. MATUSDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
7 See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS? HATE SPEECH,
PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT, 122-31 (1999) (describing the ex-
perience of other countries, largely in Europe, that adopted hate speech bans).
80 See Post, supra note 41, at 279-85.
81 See generally infra note 101.
82 Robert Post, Religion and Freedom of Speech: Portraits of Muhammad, 14
CONSTELLATIONS 72 (2007); for a critique, see Kahn, supra note 41, at 576-81.
83 Rosenfeld, supra note 13, at 288.
84 Haraszti, supra note 38, at xiii.
215
speech laws with a rejection of the slippery slope argument.85 Final-
ly, Peter Molnar, although emphasizing the importance of art and
education in responding to hate speech, also calls for banning hate
speech when the surrounding circumstances suggest "imminent
danger of violence."8 6
Faced with this, a free speech traditionalist from the United
States would have to concede that he or she is sailing upstream.
While European bans of Holocaust denial may be outside the global
mainstream, the volume reveals the strength of the emerging con-
sensus that speech which intimidates or threatens violence based on
race, religion, or ethnicity can be punished. What might be even
more shocking to the traditionalist is the extent to which some of the
U.S. contributors, without necessarily supporting European hate
speech laws (and in some instances vigorously opposing them), have
nevertheless taken positions that in their own way support this
emerging consensus. As if this were not bad enough, there is also ev-
idence that the United States punishes some forms of hate speech
85 Mendel, supra note 17, at 417, 425. See also Parekh, supra note 8, at 49 (not-
ing that in ordinary life "we make such exceptions all the time" without sliding
from side to side unable to stop). According to Mendel:
While there are cases of overbroad hate speech laws being
abused, there are no examples of well-drafted laws gradual-
ly leading to greater restrictions on free speech. Democra-
cies around the world have been applying hate speech laws
for decades and, while the rate of prosecutions may fluctu-
ate in different countries and at different times, there has
been no general trend toward greater and broader applica-
tion of these laws.
Mendel, supra note 17, at 425. While Mendel may be right in a general sense, the
growth of memory laws in France during the first decade of this century, with
laws passed banning denial of colonialism, the positive elements of French ex-
perience in Algeria, and the cruelties of the trans-Atlantic slave trade all within
a couple of years suggests that the scope of hate speech bans can expand fairly
rapidly under favorable circumstances. See Robert A. Kahn, Does it Matter How
One Opposes Hate Speech Bans? A Critical Commentary on Libertd pour
I'Histoire's opposition to French Memory Laws, 15 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016).
86 Molnar, supra note 21, at 195-96. Significantly, Molnar does not require that
the speaker "intended" to cause violence-knowledge is enough. Id at 195.
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every bit as severely as the Europeans, albeit outside the legal sys-
tem.
A. Supporting the First Amendment While Opposing Hate Speech
To be fair, some contributors take a very strong, almost abso-
lutist position to freedom of speech-at least when discussing the
United States. For example, Ed Baker maintained a steadfast opposi-
tion to hate speech bans, largely on pragmatic grounds.87 The fur-
thest he went was to support laws against discrimination (which,
conceivably, could include speech-based hostile work environment
claims).88 However, Baker saw anti-discrimination measures as an
alternative to hate speech regulation, rather than something that
complements it.89 Nor has Ronald Dworkin changed his opposition
to hate speech laws-although he is open to restrictions on racial vi-
olence and content-neutral "time, place, and manner" restrictions on
hate speech.90 Dworkin states that this is because in a modern dem-
ocratic society "[he] must accept the right of others to hold [him] in
contempt."91 Finally, Floyd Abrams, while expressing sympathy for
countries that punish hate speech, is not willing to change his "per-
87 Baker, supra note 8, at 75.
88 Baker, supra note 8, at 75.
89 Id. at 75-76 (describing how in his experience the same politicians who show
their sensitivity on racial matters by supporting hate speech bans oppose anti-
discrimination bans). The strength of Baker's opposition to hate speech bans
may rest on his autonomy-based justification of free speech. Id at 63. While
Frederick Schauer can identify situations in which the search for truth is bal-
anced by competing justifications, Schauer, supra note 15, and Robert Post can
identity situations in which the speech act in question is outside the public dis-
course (or necessary in a weak or emerging democracy), Interview with Robert
Post, supra note 8, at 24, human autonomy is harder to balance-at least when
the speech act does not lead to imminent violence. Flemming Rose, who also de-
fends freedom of speech on a similar-albeit more romantic-concept of per-
sonal autonomy likewise takes a largely absolutist position on hate speech re-
strictions. For more, see FLEMMING ROSE, THE TYRANNY OF SILENCE (2010); Kahn,
supra note 52, at 678-81.
90 See Dworkin, supra note 8, at 343.
I' d. at 342.
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sonal opposition to hate speech limitations" which for him is "an is-
sue of principle."92
Nadine Strossen is another story. On the surface, the former
ACLU president plays the part of a free speech traditionalist. In her
interview with Peter Molnar, she was not at all reticent in candidly
challenging his arguments.93 When asked whether hate speech laws
should be justified to "prevent grave harms to marginalized groups,"
Strossen took issue with Molnar's premise, arguing that it is "insult-
ing" to assume that the target of racial or ethnic insult cannot re-
spond on his or her own.9 4 When Molnar suggested that a supporter
of hate speech bans might respond that "not everyone has the educa-
tion and, as a result, the critical capacity of, say, a white lawyer,"
Strossen rejected this argument as "such an elitist statement" and
"unbelievable!"95 While Strossen took special offense to the sugges-
tion that "because someone is a member of a certain demographic
group that person is less capable of responding," she also rejected
the idea that responding to hate speech with counterspeech requires
a certain level of education.96
At the same time, Strossen makes statements that might sur-
prise a free speech traditionalist. For one thing, her rejection of hate
speech bans in the United States comes with a series of responsibili-
ties. Those who reject hate speech legislation as "merely symbolic"
have a duty "to advocate [for] some real measures to counteract dis-
crimination," including "appropriately tailored affirmative action to
specifically single out those [disadvantaged] groups."97 Here
Strossen reverses the stance of the hypothetical racial conservative
Baker describes in his book chapter; instead of supporting hate
speech bans to avoid facing the reality of discrimination, Strossen
92 Abrams, supra note 25, at 126.
9 See Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at 378.
94 Id. Strossen went on to say: "We are not somehow automatically diminished
just because some bigot says something negative about us." Id.
9 Id. at 379.
96 Id. at 379-80.
9 Id. at 382.
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sees strong anti-discrimination laws as the cost of protecting hate
speech.9 8
However, Strossen's biggest departure from the traditional
position involves the practice of non-state actors-newspapers, the
media, and Facebook users-that "punish" hate speech outside the
legal system. During the 1990s, college newspapers across the coun-
try debated whether to run ads denying the Holocaust." A number
of papers ran the ads, arguing that the First Amendment left them no
choice.'00 While other papers refused, compared to non-state actors
in countries that punished hate speech and/or Holocaust denial, the
U.S. papers were reluctant to engage in acts of informal censor-
ship.'01 One might, then, expect a U.S. traditional libertarian to take a
similar position and oppose all restrictions-non-legal as well as le-
gal-against hate speech.
Strossen did not do this. Instead, the past president of the
ACLU said that it is "very, very important to use speech to marginal-
ize the ideas of the hate speakers."102 Nor was this a stray comment.
To the contrary, she repeatedly called on political leaders and uni-
versity presidents to condemn hate speech,'03 welcomed taboos
against making racist statements, and called for the application of
"social and cultural pressure against... the expression of discrimina-
9 Id.; see Baker, supra note 8, at 75-76. One wonders what the general public in
the United States would prefer: Baker's hypothetical conservative position
(hate speech bans but no affirmative action), or Strossen's position (affirmative
action but no hate speech bans).
9See KAHN, supra note 1, at 121-35.
' Id. at 121.
'0 Id. at 121-35. Interestingly, by the time of the Danish Cartoon controversy,
attitudes had changed. See, e.g., Robert A. Kahn, News Value, Islamophobia, or
the First Amendment? Why and How the Philadelphia Inquirer Published the Dan-
ish Cartoons, U. OF ST. THOMAS LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, No. 10-07,
(2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1548705. Most newspapers in the United
States refused to run the images of Muhammad. Id. at 7.
102 Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at 380.
103 See Id at 387-89 (reproducing statements from President Bill Clinton and
Harvard University President Derek Bok).
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tory ideas."104 While rejecting legal sanctions, Strossen is quite ac-
cepting of social sanctions.105
Social sanctions may have a role to play in discouraging hate
speech. Politeness and civility are critical parts of living together in a
fast-paced, crowded, complicated, and diverse world. But social
sanctions can be very severe-especially with the growing role of
social media.106 Consider, for example, the members of the Sigma Al-
pha Epsilon (SAE) fraternity at the University of Oklahoma who were
caught on videotape singing a racist chant.107 The fraternity mem-
bers did not violate any hate speech laws, but the University of Okla-
homa suspended the fraternity and expelled the students who per-
formed the chant from school.'08 Or consider the two male computer
programmers who, at a Python computer convention in Santa Clara,
California, made what the woman seated behind them thought was a
sexist joke.109 Although this behavior is protected by the First
Amendment, the woman got their attention, snapped a photo, and
sent it on Twitter after which the "jokers" were fired.110
Among the many arguments against restricting hate speech
is one that such restrictions will have a chilling effect on speakers.
Alon Harel argues that legal sanctions risk repudiating the values of
1 Id. at 393.
0 5 Id.
106 To be fair, this is a development that blossomed only after Strossen's 2010
interview. See Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at 378 (Molnar in-
terviewed Strossen in her office on Nov. 4, 2009; Strossen later expanded on
her interview.).
107 See, e.g., Hailey Branson-Potts & Matt Pearce, Expelled University of Oklahoma
student in racial chant video deeply sorry, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2015),
http://www.atimes.com/nation/la-na-oklahoma-fraternity-fallout-20150310-
story.html; Elliott C. McLaughlin, "Disgraceful" University of Oklahoma fraternity
shuttered after racist chant, CNN (Mar. 10, 2015),
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/09/us/oklahoma-fraternity-chant/.
108 See Hailey Branson-Potts & Matt Pearce, supra note 107; Elliott C. McLaugh-
lin, supra note 107.
0 See Dana Liebelson & Tasneem Raja, Donglegate: How One Brogrammer's Sex-
ist joke Led to Death Threats and Firings, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 22, 2013),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/03/pycon-2013-sexism-dongle-
richards.
110 Id. The woman who tweeted the joke was also fired, a fact that only further
demonstrates the power of social media. Id.
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the speaker, which is problematic when the speaker's views are
"deeply rooted" in a "comprehensive ... form of life.""n Compared to
what the speakers in these examples actually suffered-expulsion,
suspension of the fraternity, loss of job-wouldn't legal sanctions be
far less frightening? One could argue that legal sanctions are more
problematic because in a society that is still racist, the legal system
might either fail to punish hate speech or disproportionately punish
minority speakers under purportedly neutral hate speech bans.'12
But this would not explain the failure to take notice of similar dan-
gers posed by shunning and other powerful non-legal sanctions. That
said, my main point is not to critique Strossen, but merely to show
how far it is removed from the traditional view in which the United
States is near absolutist in its protection of speech.
Finally, when discussing Brandenburg v. Ohio with Peter
Molnar, Strossen shows a surprisingly European willingness to allow
for the punishment of some forms of incitement-based hate speech.
When asked about the gay pride march in Budapest, Strossen said
that in interpreting the "imminent lawless action" standard in Bran-
denburg, she takes a very functional approach.113 For example, in an
" Harel, supra note 14, at 306.
112 See Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at 391 (questioning
whether hate speech bans would be enforced given elected officials, and judges,
and "where juries represent cross-sections of the community"). To me, the
stronger argument would be that in a society, as the events in Ferguson demon-
strate, where local police departments enforce vagrancy and quality of life of-
fenses in a blatantly discriminatory manner, often with a profit motive at hand,
hate speech restrictions will most likely be used against African-Americans. See
Elliott C. McLaughlin, justice Dept Echoes Ferguson Residents' Complaints, CNN
(Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/04/us/ferguson-missouri-
police-racial-bias-justice-department-report/index.html. Indeed, opponents of
the fighting words doctrine have raised the danger of discriminatory over-
enforcement. See Burton Caine, The Trouble with "Fighting Words": Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire is a Threat to the First Amendment and should be Overruled,
88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 445 (2004) (arguing that state courts have stretched the
doctrine "beyond all recognition" in order to "protect the police from criticism,
with all of the inherent dangers that such an approach presents").
113 See Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at 396-97. See Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[T]he constitutional guarantees of free
speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
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Oregon case involving a California hate publication that incited the
killing of African-Americans, the ACLU did not insist that the jury ac-
quit the defendant; instead, the ACLU took the position that if the
facts satisfied Brandenburg, and there was no "less restrictive"
means of preventing violence, the state could punish the speaker.114
In other words, in the right circumstances, Strossen was willing to let
the state punish hate speech that incited violence.s15 This position
places her well within the mainstream of the authors of The Content
and Context of Hate Speech and likely within the emerging main-
stream of the global discourse on hate speech regulation.
Other U.S. contributors also depart from the traditional
view-albeit less dramatically. Robert Post is willing to punish
speech that displays an intent to intimidate and, more generally, is
willing to punish speech that falls outside public discourse-a broad
category that includes the workplace and possibly college campus-
es.116 Theodore Shaw, a voting rights litigator with the NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund, takes a very similar position to
Strossen on incitement, and like Harel, argues that racist speech is
"without value."117 Although Shaw would be "very, very careful" be-
fore banning hate speech, he sees legal regulation as a legitimate al-
ternative.118 Shaw also shares Yared Legesse Mengistu's position
that speech targeting historically disadvantaged minority groups is
more worthy of punishment han speech that targets the majority." 9
Indeed, Shaw goes a little further in questioning whether African-
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action .... ").
114 Id. at 397. The case in question was Berhanu v. Metzger, 850 P.2d 373, 375-
76 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
115 Recall that this was the position of Miklos Haraszti, the OSCE rapporteur on
media freedom who introduced the volume. See Haraszti, supra note 38, at xiii.
16Interview with Robert Post, supra note 8, at 26, 29. See Robert C. Post, Racist
Speech, Democracy and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV, 267, 318
(1991) (conceding that "[t]he regulation of racist speech within public institu-
tions of higher learning . . . does not turn on the value of democratic self-
governance and in realization public discourse").
117 Interview with Theodore Shaw, supra note 25, at 404,409.
11 Id.
'19 Id. at 408-09; Mengistu, supra note 9, at 352-77.
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American speech targeting White people is hate speech-as opposed
to expressions of frustration at White dominance and exploita-
tion.120
B. The United States Already Informally "Punishes" Some Hate Speech
A second shift in the undermining of the traditional view that
the United States protects hate speech focuses on institutions, rather
than individuals. In an enlightening essay, Arthur Jacobson and
Bernhard Schlink describe three U.S. institutions that restrict hate
speech: employers, who, because of Title VII, operate as surrogate
enforcers of hate speech standards;121 broadcast and cable regula-
tors who censor themselves based on standards that are established
and enforced privately;122 and campus speech codes, which often
contain sweeping definitions, broad obligations to self-report hateful
speech, and potentially draconian punishments.123 The result is a
distinctly "American" model of hate speech regulation which "sup-
presses hate speech only incidentally, only as part of other purposes,
not specifically and never by name" but works within institutions
where the possibility of hate speech is the greatest.124 Jacobson and
Schlink conclude that "[t]he American way may . .. wind up sup-
pressing more types of speech more effectively than occurs in the
other constitutional democracies."125 As a result, the forces opposed
to hate speech in American life do not need criminal sanctions-
entrenched in employers, networks and the college campus, they
have already seized the "commanding heights of a democratic pub-
lic."
126
Even if the anti-hate speech forces have not won, the tradi-
tional image that contrasts a freedom-loving United States and an
overly restrictive Europe is in tatters. For one thing, the volume
120 Interview with Theodore Shaw, supra note 25, at 409.
121 Jacobson & Schlink, supra note 20, at 219-27.
122 Id. at 227-32.
123 Id. at 227, 232-39.
124 Id. at 239.
125 Id. at 240.
126 Id. at 241.
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shows how the Europe versus U.S. contrast is incomplete-it leaves
out the rest of the world. Moreover, the United States censors more
speech than the First Amendment absolutists have led us to believe.
Finally, the U.S. lawyers, scholars, and legal academics who have con-
tributed to The Content and Context of Hate Speech have shown an
increasing willingness to come out of their trenches and meet Eu-
rope-and the rest of the world-in the middle. If hate speech can-
not be criminally regulated, shunning is a possibility. While content-
based bans on hate speech are unlikely in the United States in the
near future, even a former ACLU president is willing to allow pun-
ishment of speech that incites-provided it is done in the least re-
strictive means possible.127 In the future, the discussion over hate
speech regulation will move to this middle ground. One place where
the middle ground is growing the fastest is in the area we shall dis-
cuss next: how states can or should respond to hate speech.
IV. How Do SOCIETIES ACTUALLY RESPOND TO HATE SPEECH?
It is easy to declare that one is "for" or "against" hate speech
bans. As a practical matter, however, what does supporting or op-
posing hate speech bans actually mean? Do supporters of hate
speech bans want to sentence all hate speakers to hard labor-as
German Holocaust denier Ewald Althans was?128 Do all opponents of
hate speech bans insist on strict state neutrality, so that any depar-
ture from strict neutrality-such as Strossen's call for political lead-
ers to publicly repudiate acts of hate speech-is illegitimate?129
Many opponents of hate speech bans (or Holocaust denial bans) call
for public education or good speech to drown out bad speech. Are
these calls meant to be taken seriously? Or are they better under-
stood as afterthoughts-concessions the critic makes after explain-
ing why hate speech laws are unworkable?30
127 Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at 396-97.
128 KAHN, supra note 1, at 81.
129 Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at 382.
130 Sometimes the calls for education are accompanied by doubts about whether
the target group actually suffered harm. For example, L. Bennett Graham of the
Beckett Fund, an opponent of the Defamation of Religions concept, calls for ed-
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Fortunately, the contributors to The Content and Context of
Hate Speech have done an excellent job focusing on the problem of
response to hate speech, and in the process, moving the topic from
an afterthought to a subject worthy of its own discussion. Peter
Molnar's call at the start of his chapter to focus on the most effective
law and policy to combat hate speech sets the tone for the entire
volume.'3' In what follows, I will first address legal responses to
hate speech. In the traditional view, the very mention of the legal
regulation of hate speech conjures up images of prisoners in leg
irons. But as we shall see, there are a wide variety of approaches the
law can take, ranging from prison sentences, to criminal fines, to civil
court actions. One can also examine the frequency of prosecution
and the possibility of largely, or purely, symbolic legislation against
hate speech.132
Second, I will turn to non-legal measures. The contributors to
The Content and Context of Hate Speech have discussed a rich set of
non-legal possibilities, including using art and education as a re-
sponse to hate speech, having the government enable victims and
bystanders to respond to the hateful speech by engaging in
counterspeech, and using techniques such as public condemnation
and shunning to socially isolate the hate speakers. Non-legal re-
sponses, however, face two challenges. First, are these measures ef-
fective in curbing hate speech (or as effective as a society has a right
to expect)? Second, to the extent the measures are effective, do they
raise concerns about chilling speech or violating state neutrality that
led some observers to oppose hate speech bans in the first place?
ucation against Islamophobia. But this call is undermined by his argument that
Muslims cannot experience hate speech in the same way African-Americans do
because religion, unlike race, is mutable. See Robert A. Kahn, A Margin ofAppre-
ciation for Muslims? Viewing the Defamation of Religions Debate through Otto-
Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 5 U. CHARLESTON L. REv. 401, 409-11 (2011) (dis-
cussing L. Bennett Graham, Defamation of Religions: The End of Pluralism, 23
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 69 (2009)). If Graham is serious about his substantive argu-
ment, why should he care about Islamophobia at all?
131 Molnar, supra note 21, at 184 (emphasis added).
132 Suk, supra note 7, at 144.
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A. Rethinking Legal Measures Against Hate Speech: Prison, Fines, and
Symbolic Legislation
The traditional view spends more time discussing whether
hate speech should be punished than what the punishment should
be. They spend very little time-except when discussing certain high
profile cases-about he decision to prosecute. The assumption is
straightforward: If there is a law on the books, we have to assume it
is going to be used. If that law includes prison time, we have to as-
sume the hate speaker will go to prison. Human history is sufficiently
full of repressive governments imprisoning free-thinkers, journalists,
and outspoken citizens for these fears to have some currency.133 As
the contributors to the Herz and Molnar volume show, however, the
actual criminalization and prosecution of hate speech laws is consid-
erably more complicated.
In this regard, Julie Suk's analysis of Holocaust denial egisla-
tion in France does a very good job in raising these complications.
According to Suk, while France bans Holocaust denial, the number of
cases prosecuted has been very small and many of the books that
have been subject o litigation under France's ban are available in
French libraries.134 In effect, the French Holocaust denial ban is
symbolic-the relatively small number of prosecutions under the
law is less important than sending the message that the state can
govern legitimately because it has put to rest its connection with the
anti-Semitic Vichy regime.135 The French ban on Holocaust denial
turns Robert Post's theory of democratic legitimacy on its head: For
Suk and the French, it is the absence of a speech ban, not its pres-
ence, which would render French democracy illegitimate.136 At the
133 For a good overview of this history of oppression, see LEONARD W. LEVY,
BLASPHEMY: A VERBAL OFFENSE AGAINST THE SACRED, FROM MOSES TO SALMAN RUSHDIE
(1995). While Levy is careful to present arguments on both sides, the impres-
sion one gets after reading 500 pages of offensive speech countered by legal
condemnation and often cruel punishments is a sense of relief to be living in a
modern society.
134 Suk, supra note 7, at 153.
131 Id. at 145.
13 Post recognizes this but focuses primarily on the part of Suk's essay that
compares France to the United States, arguing that the American state is less
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same time, it shows how a law that is rarely used can have an im-
portant impact.
There are, however, limitations to the symbolic approach.
Presented with Suk's argument, Strossen replied that real anti-
discrimination laws would be much more effective than a "symbolic"
hate speech ban.137 Moreover, if a society is "engaging in [] symbol-
ism," they can "keep it at the symbolic level" by enacting non-binding
statements calling on society to refrain from engaging in hate
speech.138 Although Suk is probably right that the French denial ban
has "not removed the voices of Holocaust deniers from public dis-
course,"139 it is unclear whether other Holocaust denial bans-most
notably those in Germany, where prosecutions of Holocaust deniers
are more common and are sometimes accompanied by prison sen-
tences-have the same quality.140
The argument gets even more difficult when one shifts from
Holocaust denial to hate speech in general. Banning Holocaust denial
sends a particular message about a national past, much like banning
cross burning and masked demonstrations in the United States.141
Although, in theory, a general hate speech ban that was rarely used
might be seen as symbolic, it is hard to see what message such a
neutral than Suk suggests. See Interview with Robert Post, supra note 8, at 30;
Suk, supra note 7, at 162-64 (noting that in the United States discussions of past
atrocities focus on groups rather than the state).
137 Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at 391.
138 Id. at 391-92. On one level, leaders who follow Strossen's worldview do
something very similar when they publicly condemn acts of hate speech. See id.
at 387-89.
'3 Here Suk makes an interesting observation about punishment The French
Holocaust denial ban is safely symbolic because most defendants face fines in-
stead of prison time. Suk, supra note 7, at 153. Without agreeing entirely-a
criminal prosecution is probably not a symbolic experience for most defend-
ants-she is right that the lesser penalties make a difference in how the law is
perceived. Suk's position is also in line with the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe, which makes a distinction between criminal penalties and
penal laws. McGonagle, supra note 12, at 486.
140 See Michael Bazyler, Holocaust Denial Laws and Other Legislation Promotion
of Nazism, GENOCIDE PREVENTION Now (2006),
http://genocidepreventionnow.org/Portals/0/docs/Bazyler-GPN-Original.pdf
(noting that German "anti-Nazi" laws are strictly interpreted).
141 See Kahn, supra note 57, at 163-64.
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statute would convey. Even if my Canadian colleague from graduate
school would likely answer that such laws show that Canada (unlike
the United States) repudiates racism and follows its treaty obliga-
tions142-a general hate speech ban is a clumsy way to send this
message.
That said, Suk's essay stands for an important larger point:
All hate speech bans are not the same.143 Some countries enforce
hate speech bans with frequent prosecution and prison sentences,
while other bans are symbolic.144 Although symbolic bans will likely
be problematic to a traditional civil libertarian-because part of the
"symbolism" is the chilling of speech-they should be seen as less
onerous than frequently used hate speech statutes. The same applies
to administrative sanctions and civil litigation, which because of
streamlined procedures and lesser penalties, allow for a greater flow
of cases.145
142 In this regard, it is significant that Canada's hate speech laws were enacted in
the late 1960s, a time when international treaties such as the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination were also being drafted. For an overview,
see Martine Valois, Hate Propaganda, Section 2(b) and Section 1 of the Charter: A
Canadian Constitutional Dilemma, 26 LA REVUE JURIDIQUE: TH9MIs 373, 383
(1992)(describing in influence of international laws on the deliberations of the
Cohen Commission).
143 Suk, supra note 7, at 144.
144 Id. Some of the penalties can be quite steep. For example, France punishes
hate speech violations with fines of up to 45,000 euros and/or one year impris-
onment. Law of the Press of July 29, 1881, Art. 32. In Germany, hate speech (in-
cluding Holocaust denial) is punished with up to five years imprisonment. See
German Penal Code § 130. In addition, more extreme penalties are sometimes
used. For example, a German court sentenced Ewald Althans, whose life in neo-
Nazi circles was the subject of the documentary Beruf Neonazi [profession neo-
Nazi], to three and a half years of hard labor for denying the Holocaust. See
KAHN, supra note 1, at 81. Bridgette Bardot has been fined repeatedly for violat-
ing France's hate speech laws. See BLEICH, supra note 68, at 30-34 (describing
the prosecution of Bardot).
145 Gelber, supra note 16, at 201-02 (describing civil liability for hate speech in
Australia). The civil remedies for hate speech in Australia supplement rarely
used criminal anti-vilification laws with civil litigation. Id. at 200.
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B. Non-Legal Measures: Shunning, Art, and Counterspeech
The discussion of non-legal responses in The Content and
Context of Hate Speech is very rich. While Nadine Strossen has called
on public figures to condemn racist hate speech,146 Arthur Jacobson
and Bernhard Schlink have argued that this type of shunning already
takes place.147 Depending on one's point of view, this could be good
or bad. The social pressure that shunning places on a hate speaker
risks the repudiation of the speaker's "comprehensive .. . form of
life" that Harel warns about.148 On the other hand, Ronald Dworkin,
in opposing hate speech bans, argued that the citizen can ask the
state, but not fellow citizens, to refrain from acts of disrespectl49 -
so perhaps Harel's concern about respecting deeply rooted convic-
tions would not apply to acts of repudiation or shunning, at least
when done by private parties.'50
For her part, Strossen is sympathetic to Harel's concern
about repudiation-especially of religious groups.15 Writing in lan-
guage that foreshadows today's disputes over photographers, pizza
shops, and cake makers who refuse on Christian grounds to have an-
ything to do with gay marriage,152 Strossen gave her opinion that
"there is an enormous amount of ignorant, negative, discriminatory
146 Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at 381-82.
147 Jacobson & Schlink, supra note 20, at 227-37.
148 Harel, supra note 14, at 306.
149 Dworkin, supra note 8, at 342-43.
150 On the other hand, if the president or the leader of a public institution such
as a college or university following Strossen's lead condemned an act of hate
speech, a holder of a "deeply rooted" belief might legitimately claim that the
state is condemning not just the speech but the speaker and his or her group.
Indeed, a rebuke delivered by a popular politician or public leader might sting
more than a misdemeanor type charge that resulted in a fine.
151 Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at 395.
152 There have been many incidents. See, e.g., Michael McLaughlin, Oregon Bak-
ery Must Pay for Refusing to Make Wedding Cake for Lesbian Couple, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jul. 2, 2015) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/02/sweet-cakes-
by-melissa-fined-same-sex-wedding-n_7718540.html. For an attempt to bal-
ance these competing rights, see Anthony Walsh, Tragic Choices in Ideological
Battles-Gay Rights and Religious Freedom, 17 JOURNAL OF RELIGION AND SOCIETY 1
(2015).
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prejudice against and stereotypes about members of the Christian
right, fundamentalist Christians, who are, after all, a minority in the
United States as a whole."53 When these Christians are expelled
from public schools for wearing t-shirts proclaiming that homosexu-
ality is a sin, they are, according to Strossen, being repudiated in the
way Harel describes.154
The difficulty here is in squaring Strossen's sympathy for
fundamentalist Christians-even if they express homophobic
views-from racists who, according to Strossen, should be marginal-
ized. There are two ways out of this dilemma. One could try to dis-
tinguish fundamentalist Christian homophobia from White racism-
a position I am not sure Strossen is eager to take. Alternatively, one
could moderate Harel's position by distinguishing between con-
demning a group-even a racist group-based on a repudiation of
the group's ideology (which would be off-limits), from repudiation
that follows an act taken by a group member (which would be toler-
ated, even if it wound up indirectly repudiating the group in ques-
tion). In this fashion, one could exempt the t-shirt wearing Christian
from public shunning while still marginalizing a Christian who made
an explicitly homophobic remark.155
Shunning and public condemnation, however, are not the on-
ly responses to hate speech. Peter Molnar, in a very interesting essay,
raises the possibility that art can remedy hate speech-at least when
the hate speech itself takes the form of art.156 As an example, Molnar
153 Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at 395.
154 d
155 Furthermore, when the racist, sexist, or homophobic act involves violence-
when, for example, the fundamentalist Christian throws eggs, or yells slurs at a
gay pride parade, then Harel's concern about protecting the sensibilities of
holders of "deeply rooted" beliefs rooted in "comprehensive forms of life"
should yield to the right of victims, bystanders and the society at large to speak
out against the violent acts in question. See Harel, supra note 14, at 306. To put
it another way, I remember listening to the speech Strossen described that
President Clinton made in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing. Inter-
view with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at 387-88. 1 am glad he made it, even
though the speech may have on the margins unfairly increased the alienation of
the right wing militia movement, which was surging in popularity at the time.
156 For an earlier discussion from see SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC
MONUMENTS IN CHANGING SOCIETIEs (1998) (describing controversies over public
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describes how an African-American character in the play The Guest
at Central Park West views a statue on the grounds of the Museum of
Natural History featuring U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt, on a
horse with a barefoot slave on one side and a barefoot native Ameri-
can on the other.157 The statue makes the character angry because it
is a "symbol"-something that is "more dangerous than any bomb
anybody could drop" and because it represents White supremacy
and manifest destiny.158 After raising the possibility of suing to have
the statue removed-which Molnar dismisses as unlikely-Molnar
suggests alternatives that, without invoking the legal system, might
resolve the problem.159
One possibility is to convert the statue-which now stands
unadorned, without commentary-into an exhibit, in which the neg-
ative messages associated with the images could be put into histori-
cal, artistic, and political context.160 Alternatively, Molnar suggests
adding an additional statue of an African-American and Native Amer-
ican who fought against discrimination.161 In addition to these pri-
vate steps that the Museum of National History should take, there
should be "broad nationwide efforts to examine all unexplored parts
of related structures of subordination, both past and present."162
These artistic efforts will help those offended by a particular piece of
art; at the same time, the act of providing the commentary, or creat-
ing the counter-image could itself help relieve the tensions created
monuments such as the Confederate flag, and monuments to Civil War figures
in a variety of different contexts).
157 Molnar, supra note 21, at 188.
158 Id.
"' Id. at 190.
'6 Id. at 190-91. This is not that different to what Germany is considering doing
with Mein Kampf. The German copyright is expiring in 2015; there has been a
debate whether the book should be banned, or released as it is. A panel of ex-
perts, however, has decided to release or release with commentary-in effect
turning the book from a hate speech tract to a historical exhibit. See 'Mein
Kampf could return to German shelves in early 2016, DW (July, 25, 2015),
http://www.dw.com/en/mein-kampf-could-return-to-german-shelves-in-
2016/a-18607455.
161 Molnar, supra note 21, at 191.
162 id.
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by the "structures of subordination" by creating a space for public
discussion.163
Another possibility, one suggested by Molnar's proposal to
create a new statue, is counterspeech. In a compelling essay,
Katharine Gelber makes a strong case for supported counterspeech,
in which the state helps victims and their allies respond to hate
speech with their full human capacities.164 Because the focus of sup-
ported counterspeech is on the victim,165 rather than shunning the
speaker, Gelber's approach avoids the problem raised by Harel of re-
pudiating the speaker's "deeply rooted" views.166 For example, in the
aftermath of a hate speech incident at a sporting event, communities
would seek to publish a pamphlet on the subject.167 If the incident
occurred on television or radio, the communities would seek alterna-
tive coverage to rebut the "negative stereotyping" contained in the
broadcast.168 Supported counterspeech could be combined with oth-
er policies to ensure a comprehensive approach to regulating hate
speech.
According to Gelber, the objection to supported
counterspeech comes from those who, in addition to supporting
freedom of speech, take the position that the state should be neutral
For example, in the aftermath of the shooting of nine African-Americans in a
Charleston, South Carolina church, and the subsequent focus on removing the
Confederate flag from the capitol in Columbia, South Carolina, the city of Minne-
apolis has considered renaming Lake Calhoun, given that John Calhoun (who
the lake is named after) was a supporter of slavery. The surrounding conversa-
tion about whether to rename the lake, and if so what that name should be, has
led to a wide ranging discussion of diverse groups, cultures and histories of the
region. It has also led group involvement. For instance, an online petition of
over 1,700 signatures has called for a restoration of the lake's original Native
American name-Mde Medoza (Lake of the Loons). See Steve Brandt, Lake Cal-
houn name change gets another look in Minneapolis, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIBUNE
(Jun. 22, 2015), http://www.startribune.com/lake-calhoun-name-change-gets-
another-look-in-minneapolis/309249161/.
Gelber, supra note 16, at 213-14.
161 Id. at 214.
166 Harel, supra note 14, at 306.
167 Gelber, supra note 16, at 215.
168 id.
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in the competition between viewpoints.'69 Opponents of hate speech
bans often place the responsibility of responding to speech squarely
on the individual.170 In response, Gelber calls for a positive concep-
tion of freedom of speech, one in which the individuals become
"free" when they "are able to exercise their authority to speak."171
While Gelber's conception will not satisfy a strict proponent of neu-
trality, it might gain favor with those whose main concern about hate
speech regulation involve the personal, financial, and moral costs of
criminal sanctions, as well as those-like Robert Post and Ronald
Dworkin-whose main complaint about hate speech bans is their
failure to give opponents of anti-discrimination laws and other top-
ics of public concern a chance to air their views.172
Finally, in an extensive discussion of European policy initia-
tives relating to hate speech, Tarlach McGonagle looks at how gov-
ernment officials, lawyers, and academics can respond to hate
speech directly and shape the legal academic discussion about it.17 3
For example, Recommendation 97(20) calls on public officials to re-
frain from hate speech,174 while the European Commission against
Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) issues reports on specific topics re-
lated to hate speech regulation, such as racism on the Internet, rac-
69 Id. at 206-07.
170 Id. (citing JONATHAN RAUCH, KINDLY INQUISITORS: THE NEW ATTACKS ON FREE
THOUGHT 159 (1993); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FREE SPEECH AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY
135-36 (1999)).
'1 Id. at 209.
172 Asked about Gelber's proposals in the context of anti-Roma speech in Hunga-
ry, Post is happy to have political figures in Hungary condemn such speech. He
is also willing to see the state facilitate Roma speech in response if the Roma are
otherwise excluded from the system. Interview with Robert Post, supra note 8, at
34-35. On the other hand, he is not willing to let the Roma use public fora while
denying their opponents the same use. Id. at 35. One might respond by arguing
that, under Gelber's proposal, opponents of the Roma would gain access to pub-
lic fora were they subject to hate speech-a formulation that renders her pro-
posal content neutral. This possibility, however, would slip away if one took the
approach of Yared Legesse Mengistu and treated only anti-Roma speech as hate
speech. See Mengistu, supra note 9, at 353-77.
173 McGonagle, supra note 12, at 474-97.
174 Id. at 476.
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ism in sports and anti-Semitism.1 75 These initiatives, and others like
them, advance the fight against hate speech in a productive, non-
confrontational way.
Taken as a whole, the contributions complicate the tradition-
al view whereby one either threw hate speakers in jail or ignored the
problem entirely. There is a vast middle ground including non-penal
criminal sanctions, symbolic laws, shunning, education and art, and
counterspeech. These approaches each have strengths and weak-
nesses, especially when combined with an increasing diversity of ef-
forts to define what types of speech acts should be subject to re-
sponse.17 6 What is more, the choice of which intermediate measures
to adopt will likely depend on the historical, cultural, and political
context of the locality, country, or international organization regulat-
ing the speech act in question. While the resulting array of options
might appear overwhelming, the contributors carefully guide the
reader through the new terrain these options open up.
IV. CONCLUSION: MAKING HATE SPEECH REGULATION FUN AGAIN
The Content and Context of Hate Speech keeps to the promise
of Miklos Haraszti and Monroe Price to explore the "wildly diver-
gent" positions societies across the globe have taken on hate speech
regulation.1 7 7 At the same time, as one reads through the essays, one
sees that in the midst of all the diversity there are strands of conver-
gence. One type of convergence is doctrinal. There is a striving for a
common ground on hate speech regulation that would allow pun-
ishment of speech that incites to violence. While some contributors
from the United States are not willing to give up on content-
neutrality just yet, there is a growing sense even in New York, Los
' Id. at 488-92. As McGonagle points out the ECRI reports allow the group to
focus on specific issues in considerable detail. Id. at 490-92.
176 For example, the discussion here has focused on Harel's concept of "deeply
rooted" speech and Mengistu's emphasis on hate speech that targets historically
disadvantaged groups. See Harel supra note 14, at 306-26; Mengistu, supra note
9, at 353-77.
"' THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6, at xxiii.
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Angeles, and Chicago that certain types of acts should be punishable,
even if not as "hate speech."'78
A second type of convergence is functional. Although the
United States relies less on criminal sanctions to respond to hate
speech, it still "punishes" a fair amount of hate speech, provided that
one interprets "punish" broadly enough to include informal censor-
ship through the social media, nervous employers, overeager college
administrators, and cable and broadcast networks, fearful of code
and standard violations.179 United States hate speech foes may not
have seized the "commanding heights," but they are certainly in the
game. Thus, even if some traditional civil libertarians would prefer
that the U.S. government was neutral in its treatment of speech, the
contributions to The Content and Context of Hate Speech have shown
how far that ship has already sailed.180
A final convergence is scholarly. Although there are still some
hard-core free speech supporters among the contributors such as Ed
Baker, Ronald Dworkin, and Floyd Abrams,'18 the overall tenor of
the volume is better represented by Robert Post, Peter Molnar, and
Nadine Strossen.182 Similar to Post, many of the United States con-
tributors are increasingly willing to recognize the limited scope of
178 For example, one might consider Philip Harris who placed a noose around a
statue of James Meredith at Ole Miss. While one might view this as a classic ex-
ample of free expression, a federal court in Mississippi did not. Instead, it sen-
tenced Harris to six months imprisonment for intimidating African-Americans.
See Prison for Mississippi man who placed noose on civil rights statue, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 17, 2015)
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/09/prison-for-mississippi-man
who.html. Another sign is the willingness of Nadine Strossen-a former presi-
dent of the ACLU-to accept that in some circumstances incitement might be
punishable. Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at 397. More general-
ly, the Supreme Court ruling in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) opened the
door to restricting some forms of hate speech when it viewed cross-burning as
a type of "true threat" that could in some circumstances be subject to regula-
tion. Id at 359-60.
" 9 See Jacobson & Schlink supra note 20, at 217-41.
' See THE CONTENT AND CONTEXT OF HATE SPEECH, supra note 6.
.8. See Baker, supra note 8, at 57-80; Dworkin, supra note 8, at 341-43; Abrams,
supra note 25, at 116-26.
182 See Interview with Robert Post, supra note 8, at 11-37; Molnar, supra note 21,
at 116-29; Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at 378-99.
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the First Amendment model of absolutist (or near absolutist) protec-
tion of speech.'83 While holding the United States to a different
standard, Post and Abrams express a sympathetic understanding to
the circumstances of other countries that face different challeng-
es.184 Meanwhile, Peter Molnar shows that one can support very lim-
ited hate speech bans while relying mainly on education,
counterspeech and other, non-legal alternatives,85 while Nadine
Strossen shows that one can be a resolute opponent of racism, sex-
ism, and anti-Semitism while opposing hate speech bans.186
The next step is to expand the discussion. Let me suggest
three areas. First, while the essays discuss Africa and the former So-
viet Union, it would be very interesting to expand the discussion to
South Asia, the home to some of the strongest bans on blasphemy
and religious incitement'87 Many of India's current bans on religious
incitement and blasphemy relate to the period of British imperial
rule.'8 8 What motivated these bans? How do they compare to the
reasons Europeans ban, and some in the United States shun, hate
speech? Finally, what types of opposition did these laws engender? Is
there anything this South Asian experience would add to our cata-
logue of reasons to be skeptical of speech restrictions?'89
83 See Interview with Robert Post, supra note 8, at 11-37.
184 See id.; see also Abrams, supra note 25, at 116-26.
1 See Molnar, supra note 21, at 116-29.
1 See Interview with Nadine Strossen, supra note 24, at 378-99.
187 While Bertoni and Rivera have written an excellent piece on the American
Convention on Human Rights, country specific work on Latin America would
also expand our understanding of hate speech regulation-especially given the
different notion of racial identity in the region as well as the consolidation of
democracies in post conflict societies such as Argentina and Guatemala which
are now looking to their past. Bertoni & Rivera, supra note 11, at 499-513.
'88 See G.R. THURSBY, HINDU-MUSLIM RELATIONS IN BRITISH INDIA, 9-72
(1975)(describing efforts of the colonial government during the early twentieth
century to enact restrictions on the press).
189 To give a hint at what this would look like, consider the following statement
of M.K. Gandhi:
Government protection will not make us tolerant of one an-
other. Each hater of the other's religion will under a stiffer
law seek secret channels of making vicious attacks on his
opponents' religion, or writing vilely enough to provoke an-
ger but veiled enough to avoid the penal clauses of the law.
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Second, the development of social media and texting over the
past five years has raised new questions. People who spend all day
texting are eventually going to find "hate" directed against them.
Does this require an ethos of "ignoring" hateful speech because life is
simply too short to seek out every hateful comment on the Internet?
Or do the platforms themselves have an obligation to take down
hateful speech? To put it another way, many free speech theorists
view "the Internet" in monolithic terms.190 But are all Internet plat-
forms the same? Is finding a racist comment in the comment section
after reading that the Boston Red Sox lost yet again the same thing as
seeing the same message on a racist website that I need to click
through ten Google screens to find? How do either of these compare
to receiving a racist Tweet or Facebook message? The time has come
for us as a community to think about these questions with t e same
rigor we have devoted to traditional hate speech questions. 191
Third, the story of the computer programmers who were
fired after telling a sexist joke highlights a potential area of conflict
between hate speech and privacy. Traditionally, hate speech laws
punish public expressions. But in a world in which everyone has a
smart phone, the line between public and private has started to
break down. As the story of the programmers show, private conver-
THURSBY, supra note 188, at 9. One might also highlight the Salman Rushdie's
defense of speech based on the human need to tell stories which Danish Car-
toon publisher Flemming Rose has relied on in his own theories of speech regu-
lation. See Kahn, supra note 52, at 676, 690.
190 For example, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic describe the different forms
hate speech takes on email, traditional, websites, YouTube and blogs. Richard
Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Hate Speech in Cyberspace, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 319,
328-32 (2014). At the same time, however, their discussion of how to respond
to hate speech still treats the Internet as a unitary whole. See, e.g, id. at 337
("The Internet heightens one's sense of separation from the momentary target
of one's venom."). Is this sense of separation the same on Twitter as it would be
in an email? What about Facebook? From a practical perspective, it is easier to
fight hate speech on the Internet one platform at a time.
'91 These questions will not be solved at once and they may well be solved out-
side the legal system. To give one small example, the auto-complete function on
Google excludes racist terms. In other words, if I start typing "N..." I cannot
come up with the N-word. This is one small example of how one can "regulate"
hate on the Internet without government intervention.
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sations can become viral hate speech that may then be subject to le-
gal punishment or informal sanctions. Added to this is a growing
popularity of Internet-based shaming in society at large.192 If our
goal in opposing hate speech is to remove it from the public sphere,
what is "the public sphere" in an age of smart phones that can record
parts of social life previously thought to have been private?'93
One cannot fault the editors for not addressing these issues,
especially since information technology has developed so rapidly
over the past several years. Moreover, there is only so much one can
include in any volume. With that said, the ideas raised in The Content
and Context of Hate Speech will undoubtedly help a new generation
of scholars answer these and other questions in the field of hate
speech regulation. As a reading experience, I highly recommend the
book. The essays were rich, detailed, and thought-provoking. If you
can only take one hate speech regulation book with you on a desert
island, this is the one to take (The book would also serve quite nicely
as the basis for a course on Hate Speech and the Law).
Meanwhile, Herz and Molnar have done what I thought
would be impossible. They made the study of hate speech regulation
fun again.
192 See Lauren M Goldman, Trending Now: The Use of Social Media Websites in
Public Shaming Punishments, 52 AMER. CRIM, L. REv. 415, 438-40 (describing
parents who use social media to shame their children).
193 One could argue that the programmers had no reason to expect privacy given
that they were in a large, crowded convention hall-a quintessential public set-
ting. Not only that, it was a work related event; as such, the programmers
should have known better than to have told offensive jokes. What happens,
however, if the programmers were heard not at a job convention but on a
crowded subway car in Manhattan? On the one hand, the harm of the hateful
comments is real; on the other hand, part of urban life-at least in a major met-
ropolitan area-is that while you spend a large part of your day in proximity to
other people, you will never see most of them again. This urban anonymity gen-
erates a sense of privacy-and a freedom to speak freely, since the other people
in the subway car simply will not care what one says-that is in danger of being
lost in an age of smart phones. See Liebelson & Raja, supra note 109.
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